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  In this paper I argue that profit maximizing firms, even though they contribute to social 
welfare when they compete in the market, may not do so when they influence the political 
process.  In particular, I suggest, through several examples from both the real world and from 
economic theory, that corporations have played a significant role in the formulation of the rules 
of the international trading system.  They did this in the formation of the WTO, where they were 
responsible for the expansion to cover both intellectual property and services.  And they do this 
in preferential trading arrangements such as the NAFTA, where they inserted the notorious 
Chapter 11 and specified rules of origin for automotive products.  All of this is quite consistent 
with economic theory, including the literature on the political economy of trade policy.  I also 
use a simple duopoly model to illustrate a domestic firm’s interest in setting rules of origin.  The 
corporate influence on rules need not be bad, but there is no reason why it should be good either, 
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Who Makes the Rules of Globalization?
*  
                                                
 
Alan V. Deardorff 
The University of Michigan 
 
I.  Introduction 
When economists think of globalization, most of us think first of free trade and therefore 
the gains from trade that we have been studying and teaching for two centuries.  But 
actual globalization takes many forms, including not only trade but also foreign direct 
investment, financial capital flows, and sometimes even migration of labor.  More 
importantly, even the liberalization of trade has not been the simple move to zero trade 
barriers that we understand from our models, but has taken the form of trade 
liberalization that was only partial.  Some of this is multilateral, but with barriers only 
partially eliminated.  And increasingly it is minilateral, with barriers removed more 
completely but only between pairs or among small groups of countries in free trade areas 
(FTAs) and the like.   
Furthermore, in both of these cases the liberalization of trade typically is attached 
to a variety of other measures that may or may not generate the same sorts of benefits as 
reducing tariffs.  Multilaterally, the WTO has expanded beyond the GATT to include 
services and intellectual property, as well as to address policies relevant to trade other 
than trade barriers.  Minilaterally, FTAs routinely address issues other than trade, 
including not only investment but also labor standards and environment, the effects of 
 
* I have benefited especially from the comments of participants at the CESifo conference in Venice. 
  1which may be very different from tariffs.  And even for trade, because FTAs are only 
partial liberalization, they have features that may reduce or even reverse the beneficial 
effects of free trade.  The importance of all of this is that, while we have a solid 
understanding from economic theory and experience of the benefits of multilateral free 
trade, these actual modes of globalization are something else. 
  Many of those who oppose or are skeptical of globalization – who tend not to be 
economists – base their doubts fundamentally on suspicion of corporations.  Free trade 
increases the ability for large corporations to operate across national borders, thus – the 
skeptics would say – increasing their power over the economy and over peoples and 
governments around the world.  Because corporations pursue only their self interest and 
not the social good, they exploit the world for their own profit.  Thus Globalization ≡ 
Corporate Power ≡ Everybody Else Loses! 
  As economists we take issue with the second of these identities, and perhaps also 
with the first.  Economic theory tells us, since Adam Smith, that firms, pursuing their self 
interest but competing with one another, lead, under ideal conditions at least, to 
maximizing well being for society as a whole.  And indeed their competition among 
themselves reduces and, again under ideal conditions, even eliminates their own profits.  
So the fact that corporations are controlling economic activity does not, as long as they 
compete with each other or with smaller firms, mean that society loses.  On the contrary, 
it is society that gains, and the corporations themselves find their profits competed away.  
Indeed, by this argument globalization itself may reduce corporate power by forcing large 
firms to compete with each other across borders, rather than allowing each to enjoy 
market power behind trade barriers. 
  2  This would be fine if in fact globalization did entail simply the move to free trade.  
But as I have said, actual globalization includes both more and less than free trade.  One 
implication of this is that the welfare theorems of trade theory need not apply, since their 
conditions are not met.  This is the meaning of the Theorem of the Second Best, where 
partial moves toward free trade may be welfare reducing if other markets remain 
distorted.  I am not too worried about that, however, except perhaps in cases where the 
importance of particular distortions and their implications for gains from trade are well 
established.  I certainly would not in general want to reject partial trade liberalization 
based on just the vague fear that it may not be welfare improving.  Distortions, after all, 
not only undermine the benefits of some moves toward liberalization; they also increase 
the benefits of others.
1 
  My greater concern is that the particular ways that the world has embraced 
globalization have been selected for it not by obviously unbiased and high-minded 
academics, but rather by governments acting under the influence of special interests – 
often corporate interests.  That is, governments have negotiated both multilateral trade 
treaties and minilateral preferential arrangements in response to, and in the presence of, 
pressures brought to bear upon them by domestic interests.  These interests could take a 
variety of forms, and in principle could represent very broad constituencies.  But in 
practice it seems clear that corporate interests have so far dominated.  And while 
economic theory is reassuring about the effects of the profit motive when it drives 
behavior in the marketplace, there is no such reason to trust its effects in the political 
                                                 
1 For example, suppose we know that a domestic industry provides a positive externality that somehow 
cannot be internalized through a first-best production subsidy.  Then while this means that a tariff may be 
beneficial if the industry competes with imports, it also means that a tariff (on another good) is even more 
harmful than usual if the industry exports. 
  3arena.  In short, my concern in this paper is that the influence of producers, especially of 
large corporations, has dominated the drafting of the texts of international economic 
agreements and has done so, understandably, so as to promote the interests of those 
producers.  Their interests are not necessarily harmful to society, but they are not 
necessarily beneficial either.  And there is no reason to expect an invisible hand to guide 
governments that are under corporate influence toward desirable outcomes. 
  In the remainder of this paper I will first, in section II, elaborate on some 
particular examples of corporate influence that are suggested by casual observation.  
Most of these are ones that I mentioned when I first began to worry about this issue in 
Deardorff (2003).  I will then turn, in section III, to looking at what economic theory can 
suggest about this process in the context specifically of FTAs.  I will first review the 
implications of some existing literature for this issue, then provide my own simple 
example of how producer interests might seek to determine rules of origin. 
 
II. Episodes of Corporate Influence 
TRIPs 
I will start with what to me is the most egregious example of corporate influence on 
international rulemaking:  the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs).  When issues of intellectual property rights (IPRs) first began to 
be discussed as part of the Uruguay Round, the claim was that any new rules would be 
confined to their “trade related” aspects.  That presumably referred to the entry of IPR-
violating goods into international trade, especially the export of such goods into a country 
where the IPR was established and enforced.  It is not clear that new rules were needed 
  4for that, but in any case the negotiations soon left that narrow problem behind.  The 
resulting TRIPs agreement requires that all WTO member countries enact and enforce 
IPR laws that are roughly comparable to those in the developed countries.  The effect of 
this, since most IPRs are owned by developed-country firms, has been to force 
developing countries to protect the IPRs of individuals and firms in the developed 
countries.  And this, aside from any stimulus it might provide to the creation of 
intellectual property of particular use to developing countries, is a change that can only 
benefit rich-country owners of IPRs and harm poor-country consumers.  A case can of 
course be made for IPR protection as a second-best means of simulating innovation.  But 
I have argued in Deardorff (1990, 1992) that, even on efficiency grounds, extending IPR 
protection to the whole world is going too far.  And developing countries – notably India 
– resisted this effort to bring IPRs into the rules of the world trading system. 
  So why did this effort succeed?  Clearly because of corporate influence.  A group 
of very large corporations especially in the pharmaceutical industry were, as I understand 
it, the initiators of the push for TRIPs in these negotiations, and they played an active role 
in moving the negotiations along.  It was they, after all, who depended most heavily on 
the defense of IPRs, since their products, once developed, can be imitated at very low 
cost.  It was in their interest of course to prevent the importation into the U.S. and Europe 
of unlicensed generic drugs manufactured in, say, India.  But once they entered the 
international rule-making arena, they did not stop there.  They pushed to have the 
international trading system override the decision that many developing countries had 
made, that the short-term health of their populations was more important than the profits 
of the big drug companies.  I say “short-term” here because in making this choice they 
  5were almost certainly giving up the chance for new drugs to be developed of particular 
interest to those same populations.  Whether they understood that cost or not, I don’t 
know, but it was the choice they had made.  And the drug companies sought to rule that 
choice essentially illegal. 
  My point is not that the TRIPs agreement is harmful, even though I may believe 
that it is. My point is that the TRIPs agreement was negotiated for reasons that had 
nothing to do with whether it was harmful or not, but only to do with whether it would 
increase the profits of some powerful corporations.  And I am not saying either that these 
corporations were behaving badly.  I happen to think that pharmaceutical companies have 
made a huge contribution to the well-being of modern society, and I do not generally 
begrudge them the large profits that they earn when one of their discoveries is a success.  
Their pursuit of profit through research and development as well as marketing has, I am 
quite willing to believe, made the world a better place. 
  The problem is that they were permitted to pursue profit not just in their industry 
but also by influencing international negotiations on the rules that they themselves would 
play by.  And not surprisingly, they used their power to design those rules to their own 
maximum advantage.  They could hardly have been expected not to.  The error was in 
letting them influence the negotiations in the first place.  In their particular case, it would 
not have been hard to prevent this, since the relevance of their concerns for trade 
negotiations was always suspect.  They could have been told to take their case to the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, rather than to GATT and the WTO. 
  6GATS 
I claim that there is no reason to expect corporate influence on rule making to be 
beneficial. But there is also no reason to expect it to be harmful.  My second example, I 
believe, demonstrates this.  Prior to the Uruguay Round, the GATT covered only trade in 
goods.  Indeed, international transactions in services were not even regarded as trade.  
Since they typically required some sort of producer presence in the country consuming 
the service, they were considered to be part of foreign direct investment, and so were 
subject to much weaker disciplines on restrictive policies than the rules governing trade 
policy under the GATT. 
  At some point during the 1980s, I am told, participants in certain service 
industries got the idea of arguing that what they did was trade after all, and that it should 
be covered under GATT.  They made this case to the U.S. government, which in turn 
placed services on the agenda of the Uruguay Round. The end result was not, of course, 
to include services in the GATT per se, which continues to be the central pillar of the 
WTO, but instead to negotiate a new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)  
to provide its own discipline to service transactions. 
  This made good sense, in two respects.  First, many have argued that the gains 
from international service transactions are just as real as the gains from trade in goods, 
and indeed the economic causes and effects are very much the same.  I made this case 
myself early on, in Deardorff (1985). 
  On the other hand, the policies that are applied to services are quite different from 
the policies that are applied to trade in goods, and they do not even include anything that 
is exactly comparable to the tariffs that were the original focus of the GATT.  So the 
  7same rules could not apply directly, and it made sense to negotiate a new agreement to 
cover services.   
The GATS itself did not accomplish much liberalization, if any, although some 
has come in subsequent agreements.  And there are disagreements about how 
liberalization in these markets ought to proceed.  But my point here is simply to note that 
these issues might never have been addressed had it not been for the influence of 
American corporate executives in the service industries who saw an opportunity and 
pressed their case.  They did it, I presume, primarily to benefit themselves and their 
firms, but in this case economics is very much on their side and I think the world as a 
whole stands to benefit. 
Not all would agree with this, of course.  Precisely because services are 
interlinked with FDI, the import of services can be seen as even more threatening to a 
country’s domestic interests than imports of goods.  And furthermore, the perception that 
many service industries were dominated by large corporations from rich countries created 
the fear that, in these industries, developing countries stood only to lose from freer trade. 
Of course this second concern is exactly what trade following comparative 
advantage is all about, and while competing industries may lose, their countries gain from 
services that are more efficiently supplied.  Indeed, one can argue that the gains from 
trade are even larger here than in many goods industries, because so many services 
provide essential inputs, including infrastructure, for other industries.  Access to world-
class service providers might well allow some developing-country manufacturing 
industries to exploit a comparative advantage that would otherwise be undermined by the 
need to use expensive and low quality local services. 
  8NAFTA Chapter 11 
The NAFTA agreement was a massive document, and those of us who tried to analyze 
the likely effects of NAFTA tended to focus on those few aspects of it that we best 
understood.  Not surprisingly, there were pieces of it that we neglected, some that we 
failed even to know about.  One of these that later drew a good deal of public attention 
was Chapter 11, on investment.  Motivated by concern that a government might 
expropriate the property of a foreign direct investor, Chapter 11 requires that any such 
expropriation, direct or indirect, be accompanied by appropriate compensation.  
Furthermore, it entitles the victim of such expropriation to bring a case before a NAFTA 
tribunal against the national government of the country where the expropriation took 
place.   
This, it turns out, may provide a powerful tool for corporations in one NAFTA 
country to use against governments (including state and local) in another NAFTA 
country, whenever a government uses a policy or regulation that reduces the 
corporation’s profit.  Or so it seems, at least from the cases that have been brought.  All 
three NAFTA governments have been named in such cases.  Opponents of NAFTA point 
especially to attempts at environmental regulation that have been challenged under 
Chapter 11 on the grounds that they reduce the profit of a foreign NAFTA firm.  The 
most visible such case has been against the US by the Canadian Methanex Corporation, 
seeking compensation for a California prohibition against a fuel additive they supplied 
that had been judged to be toxic. 
This particular case is still pending, so it is too soon to know how it will be 
decided.  Of the 22 other cases that have been brought under Chapter 11, only five have 
  9led to decisions – three of them positive – while others have been settled or withdrawn.  I 
find it hard to judge the merits of these cases, since many who write about this issue do 
not even pretend to be unbiased.  But my impression is that the panels deciding these 
cases have been far less expansive than the NAFTA opponents feared. 
However, my point here is not to argue the merits of Chapter 11 and the way it 
has been administered.  Rather what I want to stress is the unprecedented nature of the 
agreement itself, in two respects.  First, as I said above, Chapter 11 covers not just direct 
expropriation – as when a government takes over ownership of foreign firm’s property – 
but also indirect.  What that actually means remains to be determined by the cases as they 
are brought and decided, but as the Methanex case suggests, some would argue that 
indirect expropriation includes policy changes that reduce the value of a foreign 
investment.  As I understand it (which admittedly is not very well), that could turn out to 
be an expansion of property rights beyond what most countries, including the United 
States, include in domestic law. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Chapter 11 allows an unprecedented right 
of private action against the government of another country to be decided by an 
international tribunal.  Prior to NAFTA – in the US-Canada FTA for example, and also in 
the GATT – such tribunals were available in trade law only for disputes between 
governments.  But NAFTA does not require that an aggrieved private party go through its 
own government; it files the case directly against the government of another country. 
So why did NAFTA come to include such an unusually strong facility for private 
action?  I myself know little about how NAFTA was negotiated and nothing at all about 
the origin of Chapter 11.  But consider who gains from Chapter 11.  On the one hand, 
  10companies from NAFTA countries that invest in other NAFTA countries gain, either 
leverage over policies that might harm them or substantial compensation, if their cases 
succeed or induce a settlement in their favor.  On the other hand, the countries themselves 
may gain from a higher level of direct investment, as foreign investors are reassured by 
Chapter 11 against the risk of adverse policy decisions.  But if the latter was the dominant 
factor in motivating Chapter 11, one has to wonder why governments eager to attract FDI 
could not have provided such reassurance more directly with their own laws.  The 
likelihood therefore seems high that Chapter 11 was written expressly for the companies 
that stood to benefit from it.  And the impression that this was the case seems heightened 
by the fact that nobody spoke of Chapter 11 when the NAFTA agreement was being 
debated. 
So regardless of the merits of Chapter 11, its existence strikes me as fairly strong 
evidence, once again, of the power of corporate interests in setting the rules of the 
international trading system. 
NAFTA Rules of Origin 
Because it is a free trade area rather than a customs union, thus leaving external tariffs 
unchanged and usually different for imports of the same good into different member 
countries, the NAFTA must include rules of origin.  That is, for a good to cross from one 
NAFTA country to another free of tariff, it must be regarded as having “originated” 
within NAFTA, and the word “originated” must be defined.  What this definition should 
be is not obvious, and it can matter a great deal as I will illustrate in section III below.  
  11Economists have examined the effects of various rules of origin, without any consensus 
emerging as to what they should be.
2   
Two plausible candidates would base origin on either the percentage of domestic 
value added or on changes in tariff classification between inputs and outputs.  The 
NAFTA Chapter 4, on rules of origin, uses both of these criteria and more, in an 
elaborate series of provisions that I suspect only a team of lawyers and accountants 
together could understand.  The complexity of these rules must itself discourage some 
producers from attempting to take advantage of the tariff preferences that NAFTA 
provides.  I have no idea whether the complexity is a deliberate attempt to discourage 
trade, or is only the natural outcome of compensating the drafters of the agreement in 
proportion to the time they spend on it. 
But there is one aspect of the NAFTA rules of origin whose purpose seems more 
explicit.  The fourth article of Chapter 4 deals exclusively with Automotive Goods, 
spelling out rules of origin for these that are even more explicit, detailed, and (to me) 
opaque than for other goods.  Are these more restrictive than the rest of NAFTA’s rules 
of origin?  I certainly cannot tell from reading the text.  But I do happen to know that this 
text was drafted by a group that included at least one economist who was an employee of 
a U.S. auto company.  And that person’s purpose was to draft rules that would permit his 
or her company to export tariff free from Mexico to the U.S. while preventing its 
Japanese competitors from doing the same.  In Section III I will give an example of how 
this might be possible, in case it is not obvious. 
So it appears that, by having American firms at the table in drafting rules of 
origin, at least in the automotive sector, the NAFTA was explicitly designed to benefit 
                                                 
2 See Krishna (2004) for a recent survey of this literature. 
  12certain US corporations.  Was this the intent of the U.S. government?  Perhaps, but not 
necessarily.  For all I know there may be a good reason why the automotive sector cannot 
be handled by the same rules as others, and if so then the expertise to write the rules 
would certainly not lie in USTR, whose staff should be experts on trade, not automobiles.  
To whom should they turn to assist them if not experts from the auto industry, with US 
auto companies being the natural choice?   But once in the room, those experts can hardly 
be expected to represent the interests of Japanese or European firms. 
Other? 
These four examples of the role that corporate influence has apparently played, two in the 
WTO and two in NAFTA, are just the examples that I happen to know about and think I 
understand.  Given the extreme complexity of both of these agreements and the fact that 
corporate representatives certainly were involved during their negotiations, if not as 
parties to the negotiations then as advisors to the negotiators, I have to believe that there 
are many other perhaps smaller ways that corporate interests have been represented.  It is 
of course not in their interest to draw attention to these. 
 
III. What Theory Says 
Political Economy of Trade Policy 
Trade economists have been led to look at political forces mainly by the otherwise 
inexplicable reluctance of governments to take our advice.  After all, we have been very 
consistent for two centuries in advising all who will listen that governments should not 
interfere with trade.  There are exceptions to our case for free trade, but we have always 
found credible counter-arguments to them.  In the end, even those of us who have been 
  13most creative in constructing cases where protection might be beneficial have ultimately 
agreed that the economic interests of countries are best served by eliminating tariffs and 
other barriers to trade.
3  Yet hardly any country in history seems to have listened.  Given 
the choice between believing that we were wrong, or that they were pursuing something 
other than their economic interests, we naturally chose the latter. 
Hence the theories of political economy of trade have focused on explaining why 
import tariffs were positive.  This literature, which has been surveyed frequently,
4 seems 
to have converged on the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) as the standard.  In 
this model, a specific factor in each industry benefits from a tariff on its output, and the 
owners of specific factors are motivated by this to contribute toward the election of 
incumbent politicians in return for protection.  Politicians in turn maximize a 
combination of social welfare and these contributions, with the result that they provide 
positive protection. 
The Grossman-Helpman model says rather directly that owners of capital (as a 
specific factor) exert influence on international trade policy through political 
contributions.  The model has also received some empirical support from Goldberg and 
Maggi (1999), although with a higher weight on social welfare than many might have 
expected.  It does not, however, address the making of the rules of trade policy, but only 
the setting of tariffs within rules that have already been made.   
However, a subsequent application of the Grossman-Helpman model comes 
closer to addressing rule making.  In Grossman and Helpman (1995), they use the same 
model to examine the formation of FTAs.  And after applying their framework in the first 
                                                 
3 See Krugman (1987). 
4 See Rodrik (1995), Helpman (1999). 
  14part of the paper just to the binary problem of whether to agree on an FTA with a given 
partner or not, they then turn to the question of exclusions.  That is, actual FTAs do not 
always eliminate tariffs on absolutely every sector of the economy, and instead may 
exempt certain “sensitive” sectors.  What are those sectors likely to be sensitive to?  
Politics, of course, and Grossman and Helpman show how the selection of exempted 
sectors will depend, as do tariffs in their first application, on contributions from specific 
factors in exempted industries.  And these in turn depend on the extra returns that these 
specific factors stand to gain (or avoid losing) by being exempted.  This, then, is an 
example of corporate influence over the rules of an FTA, if we equate corporate profits 
with returns to specific factors. 
Another example is provided by Krishna (1998).  He uses a model of imperfect 
competition and political economy to examine how the political process might favor one 
choice of FTA partner over another, and how both might compare to an alternative of 
multilateral liberalization.  What he finds is that, the more likely is an FTA to be trade 
diverting and therefore welfare reducing, the more likely it is to be selected by the 
political process, over other potential FTAs and over multilateral liberalization.  Thus, 
again, the rules of trade policy in the form of FTAs are influenced by the profits of those 
sectors that stand to gain.  It should be said, however, that political-economy models of 
issues like this do not necessarily rest on the influence of owners of capital.  Levy (1997), 
for example, examines how FTAs influence the choice of multilateral liberalization, but 
in a median voter model. 
  15Rules of Origin – A Theoretical Example 
I turn now to a theoretical example that is focused more explicitly on the determination of 
one of the rules of international trade – specifically, a rule of origin in an FTA.  I will 
show a simple model in which a domestic firm stands to increase its profit by setting a 
rule of origin that favors it over its foreign competitor, thus giving it the incentive to 
influence the formulation of that rule in whatever way it can.  As will be clear, the model 
attempts to formalize what seems to have been going on in the NAFTA rules of origin in 
automotive goods, as discussed above.  I do not model the political process, which I 
presume could be similar to that of Grossman and Helpman, although I will conclude 
with a brief discussion of an alternative mechanism that might more plausibly have the 
same effect. 
Consider a simple model of Bertrand duopoly.  That is, there are two firms that 
are the only suppliers of a single differentiated product to the market in country U, one of 
them based in country U and the other in another country, J.  Production requires an 
intermediate input that each can produce only in its own country, due to a specialized 
factor, perhaps expertise, that is available only there and that is needed to sustain the final 
product’s differentiated characteristics.  Their costs for this input are constants,   and 
 respectively, for the quantity needed to produce one unit of the final good.  The input 
can then be assembled at constant cost, the same for both of them, in either country U or 
country J, and also in another country, M, which will become the partner in an FTA with 
country U. These costs of assembly are c , c , and c , of which I will assume 
.  The firms face demand functions in country U,   and 
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  is the price of firm i’s product in country U.  
  16The demand functions are linear, as I will specify below.  Initially, country U levies a 
specific tariff, t , on imports of the final good from either other country, so 
that both firms do assembly in country U.  Later I will have country U form an FTA with 
country M, eliminating this tariff on imports from there but subject to a rule of origin. 
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Formally, then, the model has two firms, A and B, each with constant unit costs of 
production k .  They face demands for their products given by 
i,
B A j a D
i , = ≠ =  (1) 
where  ,   are parameters. 0 >
i a
5  That is, demand for each is downward sloping 
in its own price, but increases in the price of its competitor.  Each firm’s profit is 
therefore 
) (
j i sp + = π  (2) 
With Bertrand competition, each firm selects its price to maximize this profit given the 
price of the other.  First order conditions for this maximization imply their reaction 
functions, 
(
i p =  (3) 
which together yield equilibrium prices 
)
i p Ω =  (4) 
where 
1 = Ω ,    (5) 
j i sa a + 2
Profits in equilibrium turn out to be 
)
2 j i i sk k + Ω = π  (6) 
 
5 The upper bound on s, s<1, is only to assure the plausible property that equal increases in both prices 
reduce demand, but only s<2 turns out to be needed for the model to be well behaved. 
  17Applying this result to the firms U and J, before the FTA we have their input costs 
as b  and b  respectively, but a common assembly cost in country U, c .  Thus, in the 
notation of the model,   and  .  Using (6), their pre-FTA profits 
are 
U J U
U U U c b k + =
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After the FTA, firm U can do assembly in the cheaper country M, since its 
exports from M back to U will easily satisfy any rule of origin, having been produced 
entirely in U and M.  Thus, letting “^” denote the FTA, k
U becomes  .  
Firm J, on the other hand, since its input comes from outside the FTA, if it were to 
assemble in country M would fail to satisfy any rule of origin that, say, requires content 
from within the FTA countries of more than   percent.  Assuming this is the 
case, then firm J continues to assemble in U and its cost continues to be 
.  Applying these costs to (6), we find the FTA profits of the firms to be 
U M U U k c b k < + = ˆ
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Comparing (8) with (7), 
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Thus, a rule of origin, which can prevent firm J from taking advantage of the 
lower cost assembly in country M while firm U avails itself of it through the FTA, both 
raises the profit of firm U and lowers the profit of firm J.  This is hardly surprising, and in 
the example here it can be achieved very simply:  just specify as a rule of origin that 
  18imports from M to U will be duty free only if they have content from among the FTA 
countries of more than Γ  percent.  That would easily be satisfied by an 
FTA content requirement of 100%, but since that might be too blatantly protectionist, the 
firm may be expected instead to use its knowledge of the industry to seek a lower content 
requirement, but high enough to achieve the same purpose, just more than Γ. 
) /(
M J M c b c + =
I have not attempted here to model the means by which a firm in this situation 
might influence the writing of the rule of origin.  The Grossman-Helpman story, I 
suppose, would be that the firm would offer a financial contribution of some sort to 
incumbent politicians in return for their setting a content requirement in this industry of 
more than Γ.  Whether this would succeed or not would depend on how the politician 
weights the financial contribution (which is limited by the gain in profit that is implicit in 
(9)) against the loss in economic welfare for the country as a whole.  Realistically it 
would also depend on whether the politician can manage to influence the negotiations on 
the FTA at the level that would make this possible. 
A more plausible story for political influence in this context is suggested by Hall 
(2001).
6  In his description of lobbying, private interests do not in any sense pay money 
to politicians.  Rather, they help them.  That is, recognizing the limited time and 
resources that legislators have to accomplish their many objectives, only one of which is 
being re-elected, they welcome assistance from lobbyists who assist them by doing 
research and drafting legal texts on issues of their common interest.  Hall points out first 
that a great deal of lobbying takes place, not between lobbyists and the politicians whom 
they wish to sway to agree with them, but between lobbyists and politician who are 
                                                 
6 See also Deardorff and Hall (1997). 
  19already their friends – the politicians who because of ideology or their constituencies 
already wish to achieve the same objectives as the lobbyists.  Such behavior makes no 
sense from the perspective of other models of political economy.  For example, in 
Grossman and Helpman’s story, a firm would never pay a politician to vote for a tariff 
that he or she already favored on grounds of social welfare.  But it does make sense if by 
helping the politician the lobbyist can help to make progress toward their common 
objective.  The result of this is that lobbyists and their staff members play an active role 
in formulating policy. 
Hall’s theory is intended to explain the interaction between lobbyists and 
legislators, but the idea seems to extend easily to the executive branch.  The office of 
U.S. Trade Representative, in particular, is surprisingly small in proportion to the size of 
its mission, and, I would guess, needs all the help it can get.  In addition, the negotiations 
that it undertakes necessarily involve the intricacies of many individual industries, and 
even a much larger USTR staff would be unlikely to possess the expertise needed to deal 
with these.  Therefore it is natural for trade negotiators to enlist the assistance of willing 
participants from domestic industries who have this expertise.  And that gives the 
industries access to the drafting of trade agreements.  It is through this mechanism, it 
seems, that trade rules negotiated by the U.S. government come to represent the interests 
of domestic industries. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that profit maximizing firms, even though they contribute to 
social welfare when they compete in the market, may not do so when they influence the 
  20political process.  In particular, I have suggested, through several examples from both the 
real world and from economic theory, that corporations have played a significant role in 
the formulation of the rules of the modern international trading system.  They do this both 
in the multilateral system overseen by the WTO, and within regional trade agreements 
such as NAFTA.  Their influence on rules need not be bad, but there is no reason why it 
should be good either.  We therefore need to give more thought to constraining not just 
trade policy, but also the making of the rules of trade, to try to assure that this process 
moves us to a better world. 
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